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Abstract:  The third Marshall-Hicks-Allen rule of elasticity of derived demand purports to show that labor 
demand is less elastic when labor is a smaller share of total costs.  As Hicks, Allen, and then 
Bronfenbrenner showed, this rule is not quite correct, and actually is complicated by an unexpected 
negative relationship involving labor’s share of total costs and the elasticity of substitution. The standard 
intuitive explanation for the exception to the rule, attributed to Stigler, describes a situation rather 
different than the one described in the rule. The author presents an example that illustrates the peculiar 
negative impact of labor’s share operating via the elasticity of substitution and then explains why the 
unexpected relationship between labor’s share of total cost, the elasticity of substitution, and the elasticity 
of labor demand holds. 
 
Keywords:  Labor Demand, Hicks-Marshall Rules  
JEL Codes: J010, J200   The third Hicks-Marshall-Allen rule of the elasticity of derived demand has bedeviled labor 
economists for many decades.  This rule purports to show that the elasticity of labor demand is less when 
labor is a smaller share of total costs.  It is often referred to by the aphorism that “it is important to be 
unimportant,” meaning that when labor’s share is small, the resulting demand curve will be more 
inelastic, giving labor (or labor unions) more power to increase wages with less of a reduction in 
employment.  A common example contrasts the demand situation facing an industrial union (large share) 
and a craft union (small share), with the prediction that, ceteris paribus, the industrial union would face a 
more elastic demand curve.   
  The problem is that this rule is not quite correct, a point that is not universally recognized even 
among labor economists.  It holds, as Hicks (1932) and then Allen (1938) pointed out, only when the 
elasticity of final product demand (η) is greater than the elasticity of substitution (σ).  The explanation 
that is usually offered, attributed to Stigler and included in two well-known labor economics textbooks 
(Ehrenberg and Smith (2009) and Borjas (2008)), is incorrect.  It describes a situation rather different than 
the one described in Marshall’s controversial third rule. As far as I can tell, no straightforward and 
reasonably intuitive economic explanation exists.
i   
  In an interesting article more than four decades ago, Bronfenbrenner (1961) presented a clear 
historical account of the elasticity rules that focused on the derivation of the rules from Marshall (1920) to 
Hicks’ Theory of Wages (1932, Appendices III and IV) to Allen’s Mathematical Analysis for Economics 
(1938), with special emphasis on the pesky third rule.  But Bronfenbrenner deftly stepped aside from 
explaining the rule, preferring to emphasize the related important influence of labor’s share in 
determining the overall elasticity.  He wrote (p. 259) that the “variation of the elasticity of derived 
demand for a productive service with the relative weight of that service in total cost is only a side issue.  
The important role… is in determining the relative weights of η and σ.“ 
   I pick up where Bronfenbrenner left off, first explaining the problem of the third rule and also its 
common, but incorrect, explanation. I then document the exception to Marshall’s third law with a simple numerical example using a Cobb-Douglas production function.  In particular, I show that the output-
constant response to a wage change is negatively related to labor’s share for a given elasticity of 
substitution.  Finally, I provide an economic explanation of why labor’s share affects the impact of the 
elasticity of substitution on the elasticity of labor demand.  The explanation turns out to be relatively 
simple, turning on the relationship between the share of labor in total costs and a firm’s cost-minimizing 
labor-capital ratio or, equivalently, on the common marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS) of 
firms facing the same input prices, but with different initial labor-capital ratios.   
 
BACKGROUND 
  Marshall and later Hicks and Allen established four famous rules of the determinants of the 
elasticity of derived factor demand, rules that have been taught to generations of economics students.
 ii  
The first two rules, which are by far the most famous, relate to the elasticity of final demand and the ease 
of substitution in production, both of which increase the elasticity of derived demand.  The fourth relates 
to the elasticity of supply of the other factor or factors of production.  This rule is often treated as a minor 
issue-Allen ignored its role entirely.  The third and most controversial rule relates labor’s share in total 
cost to the elasticity of derived demand.  Marshall argued that labor demand was more inelastic when 
labor’s share of total costs was smaller. The underlying intuition is that any given increase in the wage 
will have a bigger impact on average cost and thus price when labor is a more important share of total 
cost.  For any given elasticity of final demand, the impact on quantity demanded and eventually on labor 
demanded will then be greater.  Thus, it is “important to be unimportant,” where “important” means to 
face a more inelastic demand curve and “unimportant” means to be a small share of total cost. That much 
seems reasonable.   
  Unfortunately, as Hicks and then Allen showed, this third law is not strictly true.  It holds only if 
the elasticity of final demand is greater than the elasticity of substitution. The issue is easiest to see in 
Allen’s version.  The Allen equation for the elasticity of labor demand is ηL = (1 − S)σ + SηQ, where ηL is 
the absolute value of the elasticity of labor demand, S is the share of labor in total cost, σ is the elasticity of substitution, and ηQ is the elasticity of final demand, also treated as a positive number.
iii  Allen’s 
equation clearly shows that the elasticity of labor demand is a weighted average of substitution and scale 
effects, represented by σ and ηQ, respectively.  Taking the derivative of ηL with respect to s reveals the 
complication first discovered by Hicks using his far more complex formulation:  ∂ηL/∂S = ηQ − σ.  This 
derivative is not unambiguously positive or negative, but rather depends on the relative size of the 
elasticity of final product demand and the elasticity of substitution.  If ηQ < σ, it is apparently important to 
be important!  Note also, that ∂ηL/∂σ = (1− S) and ∂ηL/∂ηQ = S, so that these effects depend negatively 
and positively, respectively, on labor’s share. 
  It is no surprise that the elasticity of labor demand depends positively on the elasticity of the 
demand for the final product, as Allen’s equation shows.  The positive impact of S through ηQ is also 
straightforward.  A larger S means that any increase in wages has a bigger effect on average cost and thus 
price, and eventually, via ηQ on the amount of labor demanded.   
  It is also no surprise that the elasticity of labor demand depends on the elasticity of substitution, 
because that has already been established by the second rule.  But the Allen equation suggests two puzzles 
about the role of labor’s share in the elasticity of labor demand.  First, why should labor’s share of total 
costs have anything at all to do with the effect of the elasticity of substitution on the elasticity of labor 
demand or, equivalently, why does the elasticity of substitution have anything to do with the effect of 
labor’s share on demand elasticity?  And, second, even more unexpectedly, why is the effect negative?  
Why, for example, isn’t ηL = (σ + SηQ) or even S(σ + ηQ)?  Those relationships seem far more sensible.  
Indeed, Bronfenbrenner wrote that “Common sense appears to suggest that a high elasticity of demand for 
the product and a high elasticity of substitution between services should reinforce rather than offset each 
other in increasing the ‘importance of being unimportant’” (p.258, emphasis added). 
  I have never seen an adequate explanation for why this peculiar negative relationship holds and I 
suspect that very few labor economists actually understand it.
iv  Most labor economics textbooks do not 
include the qualification, which may, frankly, be subtler than is necessary for many undergraduate audiences; see, without assignment of any blame whatsoever, Hyclak, Johnes, and Thornton (2005, p. 51), 
Hamermesh and Rees (1993, p. 146), and Reynolds, Master, and Moser (1998, p. 91).   
Even when the exception is noted and addressed, it is not explained correctly.
v The most common 
explanation is attributed to Stigler in his Theory of Price (1966).  His explanation is reported virtually 
identically with attribution in long footnotes in two well-regarded U.S. labor economics textbooks 
(Ehrenberg and Smith [2009, p.100]; Borjas [2008, p.131]).  This account involves carpenters of identical 
skill who are classified by their ancestry, e.g., “African-, Asian-, German-, Hispanic-, Irish-, and Italian-
American” (Ehrenberg and Smith, p. 100).  If each such group was treated as a separate factor of 
production, its share of total cost would be small, but because so many perfect substitutes exist, its 
elasticity of substitution would be very high (presumably ∞).  Thus, if any one carpenter group attempted 
to increase its own wage, demand would be highly elastic.  In contrast, if all the groups were treated as 
one factor of production, they would account for a larger share of total cost, but because they face fewer 
substitutes in production, their demand curve would be less elastic.  Stigler’s key point is, in fact, that the 
elasticity of substitution typically varies along with labor’s share, with a small share implying greater 
substitutability (Stigler, p. 244).   
This explanation is perfectly correct as an explanation for why a factor for which perfect 
production substitutes exist would be likely to face an elastic demand curve, courtesy of the elasticity of 
substitution.  But it is not an explanation for Marshall’s law in the form presented by Allen or Hicks.  In 
Allen’s equation, the elasticity of substitution is held constant as labor’s share varies: ηL = (1 − s)σ + SηQ 
and ∂ηL/∂S = ηQ – σ.  Stigler’s verbal example represents a different formula for the elasticity of labor 
demand, one in which σ is replaced by σ(s), with σ′ < 0.  The corresponding Stiglerian demand elasticity-
labor share derivative is ∂ηL/∂s = ηQ − σ + (1 − S)σ′.  The third term is negative and thus makes the 
relationship more likely to be negative; in this example, it is important to be important.  In fact, one might 
imagine from the example and formula that the relationship between labor’s share and demand elasticity 
was more often negative than positive.  Is it important to be unimportant or to be important?  And why?  
ANALYSIS 
  In this section, I provide a simple numerical example using a Cobb-Douglas production function 
to show that the peculiar negative impact of labor’s share on the elasticity of labor demand via the 
elasticity of substitution result is, in fact, true. There is no doubt that it is true, because that is what 
Allen’s equation (and Hicks’s more complicated equation) reveals.  It is instructive and reassuring, 
nevertheless, to see an example that confirms it with concrete and easily understood computations.  Then 
I present two complementary explanations that explain why it is true.  The Cobb-Douglas case is easy to 
work with, but it does not restrict the applicability of the explanation.  
A Numerical Example 
  Start with a Cobb-Douglas production function Q= L
aK
(1-a).  The corresponding cost-minimizing 
choices of L and K must always satisfy 
    [ a / ( 1   − a)] x (K*/L*) = w/r          (1) 
where K* and L* represent the best choices of L and K and the left hand side of this equation is the 
MRTS.  Rewriting the cost-minimization condition to emphasize the labor-capital ratio, 
    L * / K *   =   [ a / ( 1   − a)] x (r/w)                (2) 
For simplicity and without any loss of generality, let r/w = 1 and consider labor demand for two 
production functions, one with a = .8 and the other with a = .2.  For a = .8, if follows from equation (2) 
that L* = 4K*; conversely, for a = .2, L* = K*/4.  In the first case, labor’s share of total cost is 80 percent 
and in the second case, it is 20 percent.  In a firm whose production function has a larger value of “a,” 
labor’s share will always be greater, as will the labor-capital ratio.  In this example, labor’s share of total 
cost and labor’s share of total input are equivalent because the factor prices are equal.
  If w ≠ r, labor’s 
share of total cost would not be equal to labor’s share of total input, but it would be proportional to it.  
  Continuing with the case of a = .8 and w/r = 1, let K* = 10.  Using the cost-minimization 
condition of equation (2), it follows that L* = 40.  This is shown in the first row of Table 1 as the Baseline 
case.  The corresponding output is 30.314 and, of course, L*/K* = 4.  Now let w increase by 10 percent, so that r/w falls by 10 percent.  Because σ = 1 for a Cobb-Douglas production function, L*/K* will fall by 
10 percent, in this case from L*/K* = 4 to L*/K* = 3.6.  Using the production function and the necessary 
relationship between L* and K* for cost minimization yields the corresponding new choice point along 
the original isoquant, L* = 39.166 and K* = 10.879.  It can readily be verified that this input bundle 
yields the original output and satisfies the new necessary labor-capital ratio (L*/K* = 3.6).  The resulting 
percentage change in L*, shown in the table, is −2.1 percent.  If instead, w decreased by 10 percent, the 
new cost-minimizing labor-capital ratio would be 4.4 and the corresponding input choices would be L* = 
40.770 and K* = 9.266.  Now the percentage change in L* is 1.9 percent.  These entries are also shown in 
the table.   
  Now look at the bottom portion of the table for the case where labor’s share is small (a = .2).  In 
the Baseline situation, L* = 10 and K* = 40, exactly the reverse of the original case.  Output is exactly the 
same as above.  If w increased by 10 percent, r/w would fall by 10 percent and L*/K* would fall by 10 
percent from .25 to .225.  Now, as seen in the table, L* will decrease from 10 to 9.192 and K* will 
increase to 40.852.  This is a −8.1 percent change in L*.  Similarly, if w decreased by 10 percent, r/w 
would increase by 10 percent and the new labor-capital ratio would be .275.  The corresponding input 
choices are 10.792 and 39.245.  L* increases by 7.9 percent.   
  Interestingly and appropriately, the exact same pattern holds in reverse for the other input.  Its 
proportionate change is large when its share, proxied by (1 − a), is small as in Case I and smaller when its 
share is larger, as in Case II.  These impacts are also shown in Table 1.  
  The arithmetic in the table indeed establishes that S does interact with σ in an unexpected way in 
determining the elasticity of derived labor demand.  As “a” decreased from 0.8 to 0.2, decreasing labor’s 
share of total cost proportionately, the output-constant and elasticity of substitution-constant employment 
effect of a 10 percent increase in the wage rate increased from approximately 2 percent to 8 percent.  
Thus, when S is larger, the cost-minimizing, output-constant response to a given change in the wage rate 
is smaller in percentage terms.  As far as this portion of the elasticity formula is concerned, it is definitely 
important to be important.  Explanation 
  What is happening to create this unexpected effect?  The explanation is something relatively 
mundane, namely the arithmetic of percentage changes.  For a given w and r, labor’s share and the labor-
capital ratio are monotonically positively related, so that when labor’s share is high, so, too, is the labor-
capital ratio.  This, in turn, necessarily means that the amount of capital is relatively small.  Thus, when L 
and K are adjusted following a wage change so as to make the labor-capital ratio equal the new factor 
price ratio, a small absolute change in K makes a big impact on the labor-capital ratio.  As a result, only a 
small change in L is required for cost-minimization.  And because the amount of labor is large to begin 
with, this is a small percentage change.  
  But when labor’s share is small, K* is necessarily large.  Now a change in the labor-capital ratio 
cannot be as easily achieved by changes in K, but require relatively larger changes in L as well.  because 
L* was originally small, the percentage change is larger.    
  Another and perhaps easier way to understand what is happening is to think in terms of the 
MRTS.  Let the two cases correspond to two different firms facing the same factor prices and with the 
same elasticity of substitution.  Because their production functions differ, they choose different input 
combinations, exactly as in the example above.  Figure 1 illustrates this.  In the current example, the 
MRTS equals one, because w = r.  Firm 1 chooses point A, while Firm 2 chooses point B.  These points 
correspond exactly to the baseline choices in Table 1 that are discussed above. 
  But both firms necessarily have the same MRTS at their optimal choice, because they face the 
same input prices.  Whatever the change in w is, the responses of the two firms will therefore be identical 
in terms of absolute changes.  For example, for a very small change in w in the vicinity of the current 
choices, ∆K* = −∆L*.   This is approximately true in Table 1.  In the top panel, when w increases by 10 
percent, L* falls by .834 and K* increases by .879; in the bottom panel, the corresponding changes are L* 
= −.818 and K *= .852.   Whatever the ∆L* is, it will always be a larger percentage change when L* is 
smaller, which corresponds to the case where labor’s share is smaller, and a smaller percentage change 
when L* is larger, which is the case where labor’s share is large.  Thus, firm 1 moves to A′ and firm 2 moves to B′.  The percentage change in L* is much smaller for firm 1 (large initial labor share) than firm 
2 (smaller initial labor share).  
Other Considerations 
  The arithmetic was simplified in these examples by setting w = r.  But the result would hold for 
any relationship between w and r.  No matter what the factor price ratio is, when labor’s share of total cost 
is greater, so is the labor-capital ratio, holding w/r constant. That is the critical factor.  The share of labor 
in total cost is monotonically related to the labor-capital ratio.  
  The Cobb-Douglas production function used in the example has constant returns to scale and an 
elasticity of substitution equal to one.  Neither of these properties affects the results here.  With other than 
constant returns to scale, the cost-minimization condition in equation (1) would have a second parameter 
“b” rather than (1 − a), but all the arithmetic would go through.  Similarly, any other value for σ would 
change the absolute size of the factor adjustments, but not the relative percentage changes. 
CONCLUSION 
  The examples I use show that the impact of labor’s share of total cost on the elasticity of derived 
demand does depend negatively on the elasticity of substitution.  When labor’s share is greater, the cost-
minimizing output-constant and elasticity of substitution-constant response to a given change in the wage 
rate is smaller in percentage terms, an effect that reduces the elasticity of labor demand.  As far as this 
portion of the elasticity formula is concerned, it is definitely important to be important.  The standard 
textbook explanation of this odd relationship, attributed to Stigler, is not correct, because in his example σ 
varies with S, a relationship that is certainly plausible, but not in the spirit of the Hicks-Marshall rule.   
  The unexpected relationship occurs because labor’s share is equivalent to or proportional to the 
labor-capital ratio and because all firms, facing the same factor prices, have the same MRTS at their cost-
minimizing choices, even though the choices themselves differ.  When the labor-capital ratio is large, the 
resulting absolute change in the amount of labor necessary to re-achieve cost-minimization following a 
change in factor prices is a small percentage of the original.  When the labor-capital ratio is smaller, the 
identical absolute change in the amount of labor is a larger percentage of the original.  When labor is “important” (labor’s share is large), the impact of the elasticity of substitution is attenuated by the 
“unimportance” of the other input.  But when labor is “unimportant,” the percentage impact of the 
elasticity of substitution is greater.   
  As far as the total impact of labor’s share of total cost on the elasticity of labor demand, that 
depends, exactly as Hicks, Allen, and Bronfenbrenner noted, on whether or not the elasticity of final 
demand is greater than the elasticity of substitution.  If that is true, then an increase in labor’s share makes 
the labor demand curve more elastic.  If it does not hold, then an increase in labor’s share makes the labor 
demand curve less elastic.  A priori, it is not at all clear whether it is “important to be unimportant” or 
“important to be important.” References 
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Table 1.  The Impact of Labor’s Share on Labor Demand Elasticity via the Elasticity of Substitution 
 
Case I:  Labor's Share Large 
Production Function: Q = L
.8K
.2      
 S  L*/K*  L*  K*  Q 
Baseline 0.8  4  40  10  30.314 
10% increase in w   0.8  3.6  39.166  10.879  30.314 
% Change     10.0  -2.1  8.8   
10% decrease in w   0.8  4.4  40.770  9.266  30.314 
% Change     -10.0  1.9  -7.3   
        
        
Case II:  Labor's Share Small 
Production Function: Q = L
.2K
.8      
Baseline 0.2  0.25  10  40  30.314 
10% increase in w  0.2  0.225  9.192  40.852  30.314 
% Change     10.0  -8.1  2.1   
10% decrease in w  0.2  0.275  10.792  39.245  30.314 
% Change     -10.0  7.9  -1.9   
        
Notes:   L*/K* = (a/(1 − a)) x  (r/w) 
             r/w = 1 




Figure 1:  Input Adjustments to a Change in Factor Prices When the 




















                                                  
i This article was initiated when my students asked me for an explanation.  Despite having taught labor 
economics for nearly three decades, I had no explanation whatsoever to offer and I could not find one in 
any standard labor economics sources or on a web search. This provides more evidence that teaching does 
give rise to research, as asserted by Becker and Kennedy (2006). 
ii Bronfenbrenner (1961) showed that the derivations and explanations of the various authors are not 
identical, although the resulting rules are.  Marshall’s rule relating to ease of substitution predated the 
development of the elasticity of substitution, and thus was not originally stated in those terms.  
iii Bronfenbrenner notes that Allen’s equation is a special case of the far more complicated equation from 
Hicks, corresponding to a situation in which the supply of the other factor of production is perfectly 
elastic.  Analytically, this case might correspond to the demand response of a firm that takes the price of 
the other input as given or of a competitive industry for which the other factor is not a specialized input.  
In either case, the supply of the other input is perfectly elastic, so that changes in input choices will not 
have effects on the price of the other factor that must be considered. 
iv A Google search of the Hicks-Marshall rules uncovers some very nice lecture notes, but no convincing 
explanations.  The account by Hicks (1961) is not very helpful.  This particular relationship is possibly 
the only element of labor demand not explained in Hamermesh (1993); see pp. 24-25 and footnote 2, 
which refers back to Stigler.  
v Bronfenbrenner (p. 258) showed that neither Hicks nor D.H. Robertson, both of whom offered 
explanations, got it correct.   